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Abstract: The authors discuss what is provable security in cryptography. Think that provable 
security is asymptotic, relative, and dynamic, and only a supplement to but not a replacement 
of exact security analysis. Because the conjecture P ≠ NP has not been proven yet, and it is 
possible in terms of the two incompleteness theorems of Kurt Gödel that there is some 
cryptosystem of which the security cannot or only ideally be proven in the random oracle 
model, the security of a cryptosystem is between provability and unprovability, and any 
academic conclusion must be checked and verified with practices or experiments as much as 
possible. Extra, a new approach to proof of P ≠ NP is pointed out. Lastly, a reward is offered 
for the subexponential time solutions to the three REESSE1+ problems: MPP, ASPP, and TLP 
with n ≥ 80 and lg M ≥ 80, which may be regarded as a type of security proof by experiment. 
Keywords: Public key cryptosystem, REESSE1+ problem, Provable security, Exact security, 
Subexponential time 
1  Proof and Provable Security 
Shimon Even said, "A proof is whatever convinces me." [1] 
Oded Goldreich, a cryptologist, thinks that traditionally in mathematics, a "proof" is a fixed 
sequence consisting of statements which either are self-evident or are derived from previous statements 
via self-evident rules, and however, in other areas of human activity, the notion of a "proof" has a much 
wider interpretation [1]. 
The several types of proof methods in common use are proof by construction, proof by contradiction, 
proof by induction, proof by deduction or reduction, and proof by combination of the preceding 
methods [2]. 
Security is a type of attribute of a cryptosystem or protocol. 
A cyptosystem or protocol is said to have provable security if its partial or all security requirements 
can be stated formally in an antagonistic model, as opposed to heuristically, with clear assumptions that 
certain computational problems are arduous, and the adversary has access to the cryptosystem as well 
as enough computational resources [3]. 
The proof of security (called a "reduction") is that these security requirements are met provided the 
assumptions about the adversary's access to the cryptosystem are satisfied and some clearly stated 
assumptions about the hardness of certain computational problems hold [3]. 
There are several approaches to provable security. One is to establish the "correct" definition of 
security for a given and intuitively understood computational task or problem. Another is to suggest 
constructions and reasonings based on general assumptions as much as possible. For example, the 
holding of the conjecture P ≠ NP. Some are in given theoretical models such as the random oracle 
model, where real hash functions are replaced by an idealization [3]. 
No real function can implement a true random oracle. In fact, it is known that certain artificial 
signature and encryption schemes are proven secure in the random oracle model, but are trivially 
insecure when any real function is substituted for the random oracle [4]. 
It shouldn't be given indifference that recently Koblitz and Menezes have criticized aspects of 
provable security in their papers Another Look at "Provable Security" and Another Look at "Provable 
Security" II. These views have been controversial in the community. Very recently AMS published a 
controversial article by Koblitz titled "The Uneasy Relationship Between Mathematics and 
Cryptography". Several rebuttals have been written and posted [6][7]. 
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2  Provable Security Is Asymptotic, Relative, and Dynamic ― A Cryptosystem 
Is between Provability and Unprovability 
The provable security of a cryptosystem or a digital signer is asymptotic, relative, and dynamic, 
which can be understood because 
c the proof of security of a cryptosystem or a digital signer is through reduction, which decides that 
the security is relevant to some intractabilities; 
d the one-wayness of an intractability is based on computational complexity, which indicates that 
the security is asymptotic from the threshold value of a dominant parameter; 
e the security proof is made always with some assumptions ― an interger factorization problem 
having no polynomial time solution for example, yet they are asymptotic, relative, and dynamic; 
f the speed of a computer has been rising continually since 1978; 
g the model of computation will lift to the quantum Turing machine or others; 
h if provable security can assure that a scheme is absolutely or unconditionally secure, a pair of 
"spears" and "shields" will disappear, and cryptanalysts will lose their occupations. 
In visualization, iron doors are firmer than wood doors from an asymptotic or relative sense, but we 
may not say that an iron door 0.5 mm thick is firmer than a wood door 10 mm thick. An iron door 10 
mm thick is secure now, but we may not say that the iron door 10 mm thick is still secure in future. 
In provable security theory, the most basic assumption P ≠ NP has not been proven yet. Additionally, 
in terms of the two incompleteness theorems of Kurt Friedrich Gödel [8], it is possible that the security 
of some cryptosystem, especially some multivariate or multiproblem cryptosystem, cannot or only 
ideally be proven in the random oracle model. Gödel essentially constructed a formula which claims 
that it is unprovable in a given formal system because if it were provable, it would be false, which 
contradicts the idea that in a consistent system, provable statements are always true [8]. Thus, the 
security of a cryptosystem is right between provability and unprovability. 
3  Provable Security Is Only a Supplement to But Not a Replacement of 
Security Analysis 
The significance of provable security consists in the thing that it provides a piece of theoretical 
evidence that a cryptographic scheme should be secure or a compuational problem should be 
intractable generically; neverthless, it can not replace "exact security" or "concrete security". 
The exact security is practice-oriented, and aims to give the more precise estimate of running time of 
an attack task [9], which indicates that one can quantify the security by computing precise bounds on 
computational effort, rather than an asymptotic bound which is guaranteed to act for a sufficiently large 
value of the security dominant parameter. 
The exact security is obtained through security analysis when a value of a security dominant 
parameter is given. Security analysis cannot attempt exhaustively all potential attack methods 
sometimes, but it must consider the most efficient attacks so far [10]. Besides, security analysis does 
not exclude formal proofs such as the random oracle model and polynomial time Turing reduction. 
In general, the security analysis of primitive problems ― an interger factorization problem (IFP) and 
a discrete logarithm problem (DLP) for example is very arduous because it is impossible to search 
exhaustively all solution methods. However, the security analysis of some composite problems ― a 
multivariate permutation problem (MPP) and an anomalous subset product problem (ASPP) for 
example is comparatively easy because the combinations of multiple variables in the composite 
problems may be seached exhaustively on the assumption that the primitives IFP, DLP etc can be 
solved in tolerable subexponential time [11] [12]. 
Why are the composite problems MPPand ASPP very hard? There are two reasones: c finding a 
specific permutation of the multiple variables in the MPP is very difficult; d ASSP is proven to be 
NP-Complete, and verified with experiments to be asymptotically secure. 
4  Is Cryptology an Academic or Technologic Thing 
The termination "-logy" indicates that cryptology inclines towards technology as a cryptosystem 
may be protected by a patent, and is a type of bit magic to a great extent, which, of course, does not 
exclude cryptology from bearing scientific ingredients ― computational complexity theory and formal 
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security proof in public key cryptography for example. Technology and science never repel each other. 
Applied academic things must be checked and verified with practices or experiments as technologic 
things. The provable security only give a formal verification of security of a public key cryptosystem, 
but the ultimate and summit verification is practices and experiments, and moreover the experiments on 
academic things should be repeatable. 
Academic things should serve technologic things, but not dissociate from technologic things, further 
not tempt cryptology to deviate from the technologic criterion, and especially not suppress technologic 
things. 
Therefore, people should appraise a public key encryption scheme or a signature scheme objectively, 
dialectically, and materialistically, but not subjectively, metaphysically, or idealistically. 
5  A New Approach to Proof of P ≠ NP 
In [13], we prove that the TLP y ≡ xx (% M) with M prime is computationally harder than the DLP y 
≡ gx (% p) through asymptotic granularity reduction, which indicates that P ≠ NP holds. 
However, the asymptotic granularity reduction is based on the assumption that the noninvertibility of 
a univariate increasing function y = f(x) with x > 0 is in direct proportion to its growth rate reflected by 
its derivative. 
Therefore, the proof of P ≠ NP for which a reward of $1,000,000 is offered by CIM is equivalent to 
the proof of the above assumption. The latter seems to be easier. 
6  A Reword Is Offered for Subexponential Time Solutions to the Three 
REESSE1+ Problems 
It may be regarded as a type of proof by experiment. 
Here, n ≥ 80 is the length of a binary string b1…bn≠0 of which the bit-pair string is B1…Bn / 2 
containing at most n /4 00-pairs, the sign % denotes ‘modulo’,  means ‘M – 1’ with M prime, and lg x 
means the logarithm of x to the base 2. 
The analysis in [11] and [12] shows that any effectual attack on REESSE1+ will be reduced to the 
solution of four intractabilities: a multivariate permutation problem (MPP), an anomalous subset 
product problem (ASPP), a transcendental logarithm problem (TLP), and a polynomial root finding 
problem (PRFP) so far. 
It is well known that it is infeasible in subexponential time to find a large root to the PRFP axn + 
bxn – 1 + c x + d ≡ 0 (% M) with a ∉ {0, 1}, |b| + |c| ≠ 0, d ≠ 0, and n, M large enough [13][14]. 
Let n=80, 96, 112, 128 with lgM=384, 464, 544, 640 for the optimized REESSE1+ encryption 
scheme or with lgM=80, 96, 112, 128 for the lightweight REESSE1+ signing scheme. 
Assume that ({C1, …, C3n / 2}, M) is a public key, and ({A1, …, A3n / 2}, {ℓ(1), …, ℓ(3n /2)}, W, δ, M) 
with W, δ ∈ (1, ), Ai ∈ {2, 3, …, 1201}, and ℓ(i) ∈ {+/−5, +/−7, …, +/−(2(3n /2) + 3)} is a private key, 
where the sign +/− means that the plus sign + or minus sign − is selected, and unknown to the masses. 
The authors promise solemnly that 
c anyone who can extract the original private key definitely from the MPP 
Ci ≡ (Ai W ℓ (i))δ (% M) for i = 1, …, 3n /2 
in DLP subexponential time will be awarded $100000 when n = 80, 96, 112, 128 with lgM = 384, 
464, 544, 640, or $10000 with lgM = 80, 96, 112, 128; 
d anyone who can recover the original plaintext b1…bn definitely from the ASPP 
Ḡ ≡ ∏ n / 2 i = 1 (C3(i – 1) + Bi)Ḅ i (% M) with C0 = 1 and Ḅ i a bit-pair shadow 
in DLP subexponential time will be awarded $100000 when n = 80, 96, 112, 128 with lgM = 384, 
464, 544, 640, or $10000 with lgM = 80, 96, 112, 128, where Ḅ i = 0 if Bi = 00, = 1 + the number of 
successive 00-pairs before Bi if Bi ≠ 00, or = 1 + the number of successive 00-pairs before Bi + the 
number of successive 00-pairs after the rightmost non-00-pair if Bi is the leftmost non-00-pair as 
b1…b1 2  = 010000110100 = B1…B6 = 01 00 00 11 01 00 with Ḅ1…Ḅ6 = 2 0 0 3 1 0. 
e anyone who can find the original large answer x ∈ (1, ) definitely to the TLP 
y ≡ (g x) x (% M) 
with known g, y ∈ (1, ) in DLP subexponential time will be awarded $100000 when n = 80, 96, 112, 
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128 with lgM = 384, 464, 544, 640, or $10000 with lgM = 80, 96, 112, 128. 
Of course, any solution must be described with a formal process, and can be verified with our examples. 
The time of solving a problem should be relevant to arithmetic steps, but irrelevant to CPU speeds. 
The DLP subexponential time means the running time of an algorithm for solving the DLP in the 
prime field (M) through Index-calculus method at present, namely LM[1 / 3, 1.923]. 
Note that the TLP is written as y≡(g x) x (% M) instead of y≡x x (% M) due to the asymptotic property 
of M, and in [11] and [12], some pieces of evidence incline people to believe that the subset product 
problem (SPP) Ḡ1 ≡ ∏ n i=1 Cibi (% M) is harder than the DLP asymptotically, but due to lgM ≤ 640 and 
the density of a related knapsack being low, SPP can almost be solved in DLP subexponential time [12]. 
Appendix A ― Computation of Density of a Knapsack from ASPP 
1) Wrong Computation of Density in Section 5.2 of [12] 
It is known from Section 3.2 of [12] that a ciphertext is an ASPP Ḡ ≡ ∏ n i=1 Ci ḅi (% M). 
Let C1 ≡ g u1, …, Cn ≡ g un, Ḡ ≡ g v (% M), where g is a generator of ( * M, ·) randomly selected. 
Then, seeking ḇ1…ḇn from Ḡ is equivalent to solving the congruence 
u1ḅ1 + … + unḅn ≡ v (%  ),                             (1) 
where {u1, …, un} is called a compact sequence (knapsack) due to ḅ i ∈ [0, n /2+1]. Seeking ḅ1…ḅn 
from (1) is called the anomalous subset sum problem (ASSP). 
Note that c we stipulate that b1…bn ≠ 0 contains at most n /2 0-bits; d if g is different, {u1, …, un} 
will be different for the same {C1, …, Cn}, and thus {u1, …, un} has randomicity. 
When (1) will be reduced through the LLL lattice basis reduction algorithm, it should be converted 
into a non-modular form: 
ḅ1u1 + … + ḅnun ≡ v + k,                             (2) 
where k ∈ [0, n] is an integer. To seek the original solution to (2), k must traverse from 0 to n. 
Let D be the density of the compact sequence {u1, …, un}. We see that in Section 5.2 of [12], the 
formula D ≈ n2 / lg M is wrong, which is first pointed out by Xiangdong Fei (an associate professor 
from Nanjing University of Technology). 
2) Right Computation of Density in Section 5.2 of [12] 
Considering the structure of a lattice basis from (1) and the bit-length of a bit shadow ḅ i ∈ [0, n /2+1] 
(on the assumption that b1…bn contains at most n /2 0-bits), the right computation of density of an 
ASSP knapsack in [12] should be 
D = ∑ n i=1 lg ( n /2+1) / lg M = nlg ( n /2+1) / lg M. 
Concretely speaking, 
for n = 80 with lg M = 696, D = 80 × 6 / 696 ≈ 0.6897 < 1; 
for n = 96 with lg M = 864, D = 96 × 6 / 864 ≈ 0.6667 < 1; 
for n = 112 with lg M = 1030, D = 112 × 6 / 1030 ≈ 0.6524 < 1; 
for n = 128 with lg M = 1216, D = 128 × 7 / 1216 ≈ 0.7368 < 1. 
These densities mean that the original solution to (1) may possibly be found through LLL lattice 
basis reduction (not certainly, and even with very low probability) because D < 1 only assure that the 
shortest vector is unique, but it cannot assure that the vector of the original solution is just the shortest 
vector in the reduced basis. 
3) Bit Shadows Enhance Resistance of a Low Density ASSP Knapsack to Attacks 
The LLL algorithm is to reduce a lattice basis 〈1, 0, …, 0, Ñu1〉, 〈0, 1, …, 0, Ñu2〉, …, 〈0, 0, …, 1, 
Ñun〉, 〈1/2, 1/2, …, 1/2, Ñ (v + k)〉, where Ñ  > 1/2(n)1/2. No matter whether (v + k) is a classical 
subset sum or an anomalous subset sum, and whether the density is less than 1 or greater than 1, the 
LLL algorithm runs by its inherent rules. Lastly, the n + 1 vectors 〈ê1, …, ên, ên + 1〉′s which occur in the 
reduced basis are the first n + 1 approximately shortest vectors, including the shortest vector, of which 
quite some satisfy ê1 u1 + … + ên un ≡ v + k (omitting the term ên + 1 = 0). If D < 1, the shortest vector 
is unique; and if (v + k) is a classical subset sum, the shortest vector is just the original solution. 
We know from the above discussion that it has two necessary conditions to solve a SSP or ASSP 
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through LLL lattice basis reduction: c the vector of the original solution is the shortest; d the shortest 
vector in the lattice is unique. D < 1 assures that the shortest vector is unique; and a classical subset 
sum assures that the vector of the original solution is just the shortest vector. 
Return to (1). Even though the density of an ASSP knapsack is less than 1, the original solution is 
not necessarily found since ḅ i ∈ [0, n /2+1] is a bit shadow (indicates that the original solution does 
not necessarily occur in the reduced basis), and there likely exist many solutions in the lattice. 
For example, let n = 4 (short but without loss of generality), M = 263, {u1, …, u4} = {48, 71, 257, 4}, 
and v = 261 (ui and v are obtained through the discrete logarithms of Ci and Ḡ). Here, the density of 
{u1, …, u4} is D = n lg ( n /2+1) / lg M = 4 × 2 / 9 = 0.8889 < 1. 
Assume that a plaintext b1…b4 = 1100, and its related bit shadow string ḅ1…ḅ4 = 1300 (thus 1 × 48 + 
3 × 71 = 261). 
However, according to LLL lattice basis reduction, sought solution will be 0011 (notice, not the 
original) because there is 1 × 257 + 1 × 4 = 261, and 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉 | (12 + 12)1 / 2 is the shortest vector in 
the lattice while 〈1, 3, 0, 0〉 | (12 + 32)1 / 2 is not the shortest, and even it will not occur in the reduced 
basis consisting of 5 vectors. 
4) Density of an Optimized ASSP Knapsack 
The modulus of prototypal REESSE1+ is relatively large, so in practice, it needs to be optimized 
(optimized REESSE1+ is called JUNA). 
Return to Section 6. When n = 80, 96, 112, 128, correspondingly there is lg M = 384, 464, 544, 640. 
The density of an optimized ASSP knapsack is D = (3n /2)lg ( n /4+1) / lg M with Ḅi ∈ [0, n /4+1] 
(on the assumption that B1…Bn / 2 contains at most n /4 00-pairs). 
Concretely speaking, 
for n = 80 with lg M = 384, D = 120 × 5 / 384 ≈ 1.5625 > 1; 
for n = 96 with lg M = 464, D = 144 × 5 / 464 ≈ 1.5517 > 1; 
for n = 112 with lg M = 544, D = 168 × 5 / 544 ≈ 1.5441 > 1; 
for n = 128 with lg M = 640, D = 192 × 6 / 640 ≈ 1.8000 > 1. 
Under the circumstances, owing to D > 1 (indicates there will exist many solutions to the ASSP, and 
even the shortest vector is also nonunique), it is impossible to find the original plaintext b1…bn through 
LLL lattice basis reduction. Therefore, at present there exists no subexponential time solution to the 
ASPP used in the optimized encryption scheme. 
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